On Debian-based distros, when an app is available as a DEB or an AppImage (that doesn’t self-update), but no APT repository, PPA or Flatpak, the only option is to manually download each update, and usually manually check even whether there are updates.
But, what if those would be upgraded at the same time as everything else using the tools you’re familiar with ?
dynapt is a local web server that fetches those DEBs (and AppImages to be wrapped into DEBs) wherever those are, then serves these to APT like any package repository does.
I started building it a few months ago, and after using it to upgrade apps on my computers and servers for some time, I pre-released it for the first time last week.
The stable version will come with a CLI wizard to avoid this manual configuration.
Feedback is welcome :)
Sorry to be that guy, but this sounds like a cybersecurity nightmare. While everybody was busy to come up with schemes that make absolutely sure that only trusted sources can update a system to avoid having malicious players push their code to users, this one just takes any rando’s pile of whatever and injects it straight into the system’s core? Like, that doesn’t sound like a good idea.
Well, I’m just automating what people currently have to do manually : visit GitHub and download DEB and install DEB.
If the automated process would be dangerous then the manual process also would be, and that would be on the maintainer for not providing an APT repository or a Flatpak, not on the user for just downloading from GitHub.
It’s a cool concept, but automation breeds laziness (by design, to an extent) and lazy end users tend to shoot themselves in the foot. So it isn’t great for security, but it also isn’t that much worse for security :)
Since some people with money tend to be litigious, and, of course, I am not a lawyer, I would advise a warning message (or part of the license if you don’t want to muck up your CLI), if you don’t have one, to force the user to accept and acknowledge that the software they are installing using this tool is not verified to be safe.
How is the manual step more secure though ?
What does the user do before downloading a DEB that makes that gap between manual and automated ?
I’d be willing to try and reproduce that, but I don’t see anything.
I didn’t say it was more secure, I said it’s about the same.
The difference is a person being forced to go to a website to download software means more steps and more time to consider the safety of what they’re doing. It’s part psychological.
Not all such packages are retrieved from GitHub, I remember downloading numerous .deb files direct over the past 25 years (even as recent as downloading Discord manually some years back).
The main point I’m making is that you should legally protect yourself, it’s a low and reasonable effort.
You said automation breeds laziness (by design, to an extent) and lazy end users tend to shoot themselves in the foot.
So, my question is : what part of automating download of DEBs from a specific source can be shooting oneself in the foot compared to doing the same thing manually every time ?
The MIT license will take care of that.
Also, to force the user to accept and acknowledge that the software they are installing using this tool is not verified to be safe is inducing fear and/or guilt, therefore is bad UX, I’m not doing that.
I already answered that first question.
And then all those app store fronts that say whether a flatpak is verified or not is inducing fear and/or guilt and is therefore bad UX. It’s not, but you are free to have your opinion.
Have fun then, I’m done wasting my time here.
I see it more as a local repo. Like, setup the repo to do what you would have done manually so that you don’t have to do it on multiple computers. I could be misunderstanding it though.
You understand perfectly.
No matter where you install from, you have to trust the source. Indeed, you have to trust every step in the supply chain.
If you are getting your code straight from the author, you are eliminating an exploit that’s introduced by a compromised account of a packager.
Carry on.