- cross-posted to:
- opensource@lemmy.ml
- cross-posted to:
- opensource@lemmy.ml
cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ml/post/12744832
As I updated the version to 1.4.0 , adding the ‘import’ feature I am sharing this here.
I made this extension because I couldn’t find one that wouldn’t ask for too much permissions (such as accessing all websites data).
Eventually I found it nice to have a TOTP that can really be audited, the code is 649 lines of JS, 214 CSS and 52 HTML. Feel free to fork, copy part of it, contribute or just request fix/features.
I have used it for more than a year every day and it works nicely.
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I struggle to think of a situation where I would willingly undermine TOTP security by storing the secrets in my web browser.
Before using this for anything you can’t afford to lose, I suggest thinking twice. And then twice again.
Edit to elaborate:
Web browsers are probably the single most targeted component in a desktop computer, have an enormous attack surface, and suffer from an unending stream of vulnerabilities and exploits discovered practically every month. Storing your 2FA secrets there is akin to putting a second lock on your door and hiding the key under the doormat.
And no, encrypting the secrets in the browser for storage-at-rest does not solve this problem, because it also delegates decryption to the browser. That means an exploited browser can access all of your secrets as soon as you request a TOTP from any of them. Closing it won’t help, because an exploited browser can trivially save or give away a copy of the password you entered, or the decryption key that was generated from it, or the secrets themselves, so your secrets are then compromised forever.
2FA generators are generally built as stand-alone programs for good reason. Even the ones that offer a browser extension don’t let it access the secret storage.
Really, think twice before depending on this design for anything important.
It’s also an extension with 1 review, by a no-name developer, with only 12 installs… definitely would trust that…
Well this is 600 lines of code, if you cannot audit that you can indeed ignore it for now. Once again this is the only auditable code out there and not asking for unrelated permissions.
With all due respect, it doesnt matter what the code is right now. This is an extension that you can update at any point in the future to replace with something malicious.
Trust is near impossible to build in todays internet.
https://www.kaspersky.com.au/blog/dangerous-chrome-extensions-87-million/32170/
Note that a plugin’s malicious functionality can evolve over time in line with its owners’ goals. And the owners themselves may change: there have been cases when malicious features appeared in a previously safe extension after its creators sold the plugin to someone else.
This is were the manifest/permission is important. I cannot emphasize enough that I had to code this myself because, at the time, nothing else would be OK with me. This was because of 1- way too big of a code base, 2- way too many permissions.
It is indeed a problem that extensions are not as well maintained as Linux distribution packages but in this specific instance the extension has no right to read any information nor send requests to any server.
I appreciate you have put effort into this, and you have gone out of your way to make it safer, but if the extension were to become malicious at a later date, expanding permissions (and relying on users brainlessly-clicking accept) or using an exploit or sidechannel would undo any of that.
The downside of browser extensions is that they are operating within a massive codebase, and thus have a huge attack surface if they decide to become malicious.
For what its worth, I commend your efforts here, its just near impossible to trust any peice of software not backed by the reputation of an established company/developer.
Every software started with 0 reviews, by a no-name developer, with only 1 installs.
This is a privacy community. Half the posters here think their toaster is listening to their thoughts. Browser extensions are a serious and known vector for malware, installing one from a no-name developer and handing it your tfa codes is a high level of blind trust.
So, are you saying you would use an add-on for OTP by a well known developer (Think about the well-known developers of No-Script and Ghostery and their history) ?
I see no issue with the add-on of the OP being advertised because some people simply do not use phones at all, so TOTP app is not an option for them. And attack vectors via the browser only apply when the user visits shady web links.
Essentially, yeah? Unless you calculate the OTPs by pen and paper, you have to use some kind of software, and therefore you have to trust that it is safe. Writing your own like OP is actually a very safe option, because you can trust yourself, but everyone else needs to trust OP.
Attack vectors apply to the add-on itself, it is (potentially) the shady site. OP has the potential to update the add-on later with its own malicious code. This is true of all addons, hence the trust issue.
I dont have any problem with OP advertising their addon, but potential users should be aware of the risks.
So basically… completely remove the purpose of 2FA?
Does it, tho? It’s like “smth you know + smth you have” (although knowing or being able to remember most paswords is also quite often a bad idea, but I digress); so you have a device and know [the password for the password manager which knows] the password.
Besides, given that logic, to not defeat the purpose of 2fa you’ll have to have another smartphone just to run aegis or something
There is an irony in password managers that stores your password but need a password (passphrase would be better). A password for your passwords. Fundamentally this is because the only secured space, only you can get in and no one else, is your own brain.
Most password leaks are usually caused by bad implementations on the server side. I have an authentication protocol to avoid many password leakages I’d like to share one day (double salt, one from client, one on server so password is never shared to the server).
No it doesnt, it is a password and a secret stored on that device. A password might get stolen on the database, or entered on a fishing website, but with 2FA that would be useless.
It goes against ONE idea of 2FA, that phones are more secure (thanks Android) and your Browser might get hacked.
If your computer gets compromised and you store your passwords on it (as most do) then you are also storing your 2fa on it, then there is no 2fa.
If your computer is compromised whatever token/cookie you will get from the authentication will be also compromised.
Assuming the computer is compromised also open a lot more issues, privilege escalation can be done in a lot of ways depending of what is being installed (even sudo was hit by such issues https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-3156 )
whatever token/cookie you will get from the authentication will be also compromised
This assumes you are already logged in. If you aren’t logged in then 2FA will protect you, unless of course you store your 2FA in your browser like an idiot.
a lot more issues
Okay but that isn’t relevant at all.
Sorry I had in mind you login in from a computer that was compromised (without your knowledge), I didn’t had in mind a computer compromised without being in use.
EDIT : store your 2FA in the browser from the extension would not be ‘like an idiot’ as it is encrypted.
EDIT 2 : no forget everything, this whole situation is absurd. If your computer is compromised your password are not (do you store in clear text?!). If you use it to login you are owned already.
Even if it’s not more secure it’s extra effort nevertheless. But as you said even without that it still removes an entire vector of attack
Really cool! How is the database stored, can it be encrypted using the masterpassword, or a different one? Can it be only loaded into RAM?
On traditional desktops like any app can read your browser data, which would be very problematic.
Database is encrypted in the local storage of the extension. So far Firefox is secure enough so this is not accessible from outside (it is encrypted anyway). The encryption is using the crypto web API (native from web browser) to use PBKDF2 key. It is decrypted with your password so the database is in RAM (not saved anywhere unencrypted) as long as the browser is open or you click to “logout”.
You can export/import all the entries with a simple JSON format (for now, simple “name”+“secret” for each entry). You should encrypt this export file or save it in a encrypted volume yourself.
Very neat, thanks!
